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The Arrival of Mass Politics and the Perversion of the Public Sphere
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It is a widely held belief that the public sphere spread far more smoothly in the countries 
along the European Atlantic Rim than on the Continent.  This article points out that while 
this may be true with respect to the initial rise of the public sphere, the expansion of the 
public sphere into mass politics presents a far more nuanced and complicated picture.  
Comparing Britain and Germany towards the end of the 19th century shows that despite 
considerable differences between the two countries, the expansion of the public sphere into 
mass politics had similarly problematic effects.  In both countries, the state deliberately 
sought to accommodate the introduction of mass politics by catering to the dreams 
and delusions of imperialism and national grandeur of the masses, emptying politics of 
genuine content and shying away from diffi cult domestic political issues.  In both cases, 
this led to a weakening and a perversion of the public sphere that it took decades to 
recover from.
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INTRODUCTION 
We often think about the public sphere as 
spreading far more easily along the Atlantic Rim 
than on the European Continent.  In countries like 
the Netherlands and Great Britain, the public sphere 
rose earlier than elsewhere.  It was more stable, it 
suffered from less disruption from the state, and it 
had the quality of blending the population together in 
a socially cohesive whole, rather than breaking down 
the fabric of the state as in France in the decades 
preceding the French Revolution.  
The public spheres of the Netherlands and Britain 
were of distinctly higher quality than those on the 
Continent.  What was initially an elitist phenomenon 
rapidly spread to comprise the wealthier parts of the 
bourgeoisie and even fairly seamlessly to the working 
classes – originally through newspapers catering to the 
lower classes, but eventually also by including them in 
the electoral franchise, providing them with the right 
to vote, to organize, and to vote for their own parties. 
Not so the European Continent.  In countries like 
Germany and France we think of the public sphere as 
spreading through strife and confl ict, with the working 
classes not really permanently integrated in a socially 
cohesive whole until far into the 20th century.  In 
these, mass politics produced confl ict, strife, attempts 
at revolution and government suppression.
Is however this somewhat black-and-white story 
accurate?  If we shift our focus from the rise of the 
public sphere some time around the 17th century, to 
the rise of mass politics a few centuries later, I argue 
that there are at least as many similarities between 
the British and the German experiences as there are 
differences.  In the second half of the 19th century, 
the inclusion of the masses led to fragmentary 
tendencies in both countries and to the reliance on 
foreign politics, colonial politics, and of the politics 
of Empire to divert attention away from the domestic 
scene.  Granted, Britain enjoyed calmer waters than 
Germany, and Britain’s attempt at including the 
masses took place far more within the already existing 
political framework.  Also, the already existing 
British institutional and political framework was more 
open and parliamentary, and far more conducive to 
the seamless inclusion of new parties and viewpoints. 
Yet, there is no doubt that this process in Britain, 
as in Germany, led to a deterioration of the public 
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1 This is an argument that can also be found with for instance Kant (1991 [1784]) and Hegel (1952 [1821]). 
2 In Eckstein’s (1975:108) terminology, this is a plausibility probe.  The results of the study are not conclusive, but suffi ciently rooted in data to warrant 
more rigorous testing. 
sphere, to a shift away from domestic political issues 
with foreign politics being actively used to increase 
working class support for the existing political 
institutions.  It was the end to the relative calm of 
the elitist consensus of the Concert of Europe and 
the fruition of a foreign policy paradigm where mass 
politics and nationalism created a far more volatile 
foreign policy environment.  Hence, Britain and 
Germany: different but same.
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
The public sphere is a notion familiarized 
primarily through the work of Jürgen Habermas 
(1971 [1962]), starting in the 1960s, but the core 
condition of the public sphere can be traced far back 
in time.  Machiavelli for instance tells the prince that 
in order to receive good advise, he needs to let his 
advisers speak freely, not having to be fearful of the 
consequences.  While this is not much of a public 
sphere, the logic is similar: The good argument 
stands the test of time, in the process driving the bad 
ones out.  And this can only be achieved through 
a frank exchange of ideas and opinions, through 
the open and public discourse, probing arguments 
against each other.1
However, lately civil society has been far more 
of a buzzword than the public sphere.  Civil society 
is a social arena independent of the institutions of 
the state, an arena located between the state and 
the private sphere, “where self-organizing groups, 
movements, relatively autonomous from the state, 
attempt to articulate values, create associations and 
solidarities and advance their interests” vis-à-vis the 
state (Linz & Stepan 1996:9).  A healthy civil society 
is commonly considered a precondition for solving 
confl icts, establishing democracy and developing 
ailing economies.  Compared to this, the public 
sphere is a distinct (while related) concept.  It consists 
of institutions of information and communication 
that people rely on when they interact – when 
they exchange views, formulate opinions, express 
identities and formulate rules of conduct.  Such 
institutions have a long history in the West.  Schools, 
universities, newspapers, publishing houses, libraries, 
unions, scientifi c societies and similar institutions, 
evolved early in the seafaring nations along the 
north-Atlantic rim (Knutsen 1997; 1999).  While no 
public sphere can exist without civil society, civil 
society does not in itself imply a public sphere.  A 
society may have its fair share of self-organizing, 
relatively autonomous groups, advancing their own 
interests, but this does not necessarily imply a free 
and public political discourse, open discussion of 
political issues and institutions, political norms or 
values.  The suggestion made here is that it is the 
public sphere rather than civil society that has been 
instrumental with respect to creating the growth, 
development and prosperity seen in the Western 
world.  The free and public political discourse of a 
well-functioning public sphere helps build substance 
to the groups and associations that we normally think 
of as civil society.
However, while a healthy and vibrant public 
sphere may be the key to long-term success and 
prosperity as a nation, it is not a given that we 
linearly and by necessity move from a less to a more 
sophisticated public sphere.  Rather, the ride may 
easily have been distinctly bumpy, and it would be 
naïve to overlook the possibility that secular macro 
trends have affected the development and quality of 
the public sphere across countries.  This article uses 
a combination of historical and comparative methods 
to trace and compare the development of the public 
spheres of Britain and Germany towards the end of 
the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century.  My 
suggestion is that the introduction of mass politics 
is one such secular macro trend, and that it had 
considerable impacts on the public sphere.  While 
Britain had a far more developed and sophisticated 
public sphere than Germany, and was thus better 
able to deal with the shock to the system that the 
introduction of mass politics was, the impacts felt by 
both states were of a fairly similar kind.  The task 
of the historical method is to trace the hypothesized 
causal connection.  This is combined with Mill’s 
(1904 [1843]) comparative methods to seek out the 
strategic differences and similarities between Britain 
and Germany.  
While generalizing from such a small sample 
should only be done with considerable caution, the 
conclusions are suggestive.  Britain and Germany 
started out from very different vantage points, yet the 
impact of the independent variable – the introduction of 
mass politics – was fairly similar, although obviously 
tempered by their different starting points.  While 
there are undoubtedly numerous reasons for this, the 
relationship seems credible.  While no conclusive test, 
it increases the theory’s plausibility and strengthens its 
prospects ahead of more rigorous testing.2
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3 One of the reasons why we actually have data on British unrest, whereas it is much harder to fi nd reliable data on France, is the growing abundance of 
newspapers in Britain reporting on such unrest. 
4 The Political Register was probably the most popular.  Other lower class journals: Black Dwarf, Weekly Political Register, Republican, Register, The 
Sheffi eld Independent, Manchester Guardian (Evans 1983:186). 
5 These were liberties that to a great extent had to do with the peculiar relationship between the many German states, which had the right to participate in 
the governing of the Holy Roman Empire, but were otherwise quite independent of it.  
6 Vienna got its fi rst coffeehouse in 1683.  By 1784 it had 64.  Hamburg got its fi rst as early as 1671 (Blanning 2008:331).
7 Wars against France: 1689-97, 1702-13, 1743-48, 1756-63, 1778-83, 1793-1802, 1803-15 (Colley 1992:1).
THE EARLY PUBLIC SPHERE
There is very little doubt that an English/British 
public sphere developed considerably earlier than 
in most other countries.  As early as 1746, London 
alone had 18 newspapers, the fi rst one established as 
early as 1702.3  By the 1730s, there were half a dozen 
dailies in addition to a host of tri-weekly papers, and 
by the end of the century 50 different newspapers 
in the provinces and 9 in Scotland (Colley 1992:41). 
Britain also had a considerably greater variety of 
outlooks than other countries.  There were numerous 
middle-class journals and radical pamphlets, many 
of which at times extraordinarily hostile toward the 
government.  Some of the newspapers and journals 
for the growing working-class readership had a 
circulation of 40,000-50,000.4  By 1780, the weekly 
sale of British newspapers was 340,000, compared 
to 80,000 -90,000 in for instance France (Evans 
1983:185; Knutsen 1999:110; Melton 2001:61pp).  
However, compared to France, Germany too 
(to the extent that there was yet a Germany) was 
far better positioned with respect to the rise of a 
public sphere – due to the sheer fragmentation of the 
German areas.  The Holy Roman Empire consisted 
of some 300 semi-sovereign principalities, which led 
to a diversity of political and confessional cultures. 
Censorship varied from territory to territory, and thus 
political diversity contributed to a varied network 
of newspapers and periodicals, far more so than in 
France.  And German pamphleteers enthusiastically 
contrasted the vices of France with the virtues of the 
German world.  For instance, almost every German 
pamphlet after 1648 refers to German liberties and 
how no other people love liberty more than the 
Germans (Blanning 2008:309; Melton 2001:132).5 
However, German writers and intellectuals to a far 
greater extent than in Britain depended on direct ties 
to the state, as they would often be hired by the civil 
service, the universities, as pastors or as princely 
offi cials (Melton 2001:135).  This made the German 
public sphere somewhat statist.  It was not as carefree 
and informal as in Britain, yet at the same time not 
as slanderous and gossipy as in France.
In terms of coffeehouses England was running 
ahead with London getting its fi rst coffeehouse in 
the 1650s, and they also spread more rapidly, so 
that by 1739, London alone had more than 500. 
However, German cities were also doing quite well, 
cosmopolitan Vienna especially so, but also cities 
like Hamburg, Frankfurt, Leipzig and Berlin.6  The 
coffeehouses developed into politicized spaces of 
public discussion.  These were space where matters 
of state were discussed and dissected in surprisingly 
frank manners.  They were places that contained 
large amounts of newspapers, some times even 
editing their own newspapers (as in the case of the 
Hamburg Patriot in the early 18th century).  French 
contemporaries were stunned as to the openness 
of discussion and the lack of discretion with which 
politics was discussed.  While these coffeehouses 
may have become more closed and segregated as 
the amount of German states declined, it is not at all 
obvious that the German public sphere was miles 
behind Britain at this early stage (Blanning 2008:331; 
Melton 2001:243pp).  
However, the above applies primarily to the 
enlightened classes.  Britain had newspapers catering 
to the lower classes, and foreign visitors were 
surprised as to the social mix of people visiting the 
coffeehouses.  Yet, coffeehouses both in Britain 
and in the German states were frequented primarily 
by men of learning and of business rather than by 
workers.  The public sphere was still mainly an elite 
phenomenon, as was political activity.  However, 
Britain differed from the German states in one 
vital aspect.  It was already a united and socially 
cohesive whole.  To Knutsen (1999:107) 18th century 
Britain was experiencing “a robust social consensus 
anchored in a d ist inct and relevant pol it ica l 
mythology...forged on the anvil of large-scale war, 
this consensus rendered England self-confi dent, 
productive and strong”.  British nationality was 
forged by war, primarily with France – almost 
continually from the end of the 17th century until 
the fall of Napoleon, in what has sometimes been 
labeled the Second Hundred Years War (Blanning 
2008:311; Colley 1992:1).7  The French Revolution 
caused enormous stir and nervousness in the British 
ruling class, which was not convinced that the same 
could not happen there.  However, there is scant 
evidence of pro-Frenchness or revolutionary activity 
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8 However, the French Revolution also led to levels of repression not seen in Britain since the civil war.  Hence, the absence of riots to some extent stems 
from this.  In 1794, politically oriented movements inspired by the French Revolution were closed down.  Mass-membership affi liations were held 
under tight government control.  1792 saw the ‘Proclamation against Seditious Writings and Assemblies’ restricting the freedom of the press.  In 1793, 
people were prosecuted for circulating radical literature.  The 1795 ‘Treasonable Practices Act and Seditious Meetings Act’ banned meetings with more 
than 50 people, and anyone speaking or writing in criticism of the constitution could be prosecuted.  The restrictions on military and police intervention 
in riots were eased and habeas corpus temporarily suspended.  Still, compared to France, Britain was far from repressive (Pugh 1999:23p, 38pp; Tilly 
1995:10,419pp).
9 Colley (1992:189) emphasizes that changes were not just a matter of appearance.  Where politics had earlier been something along the lines of a landed 
leisure activity, around the turn of the century, politicians became genuine workaholics.  And while during most of the 18th century, it had been possible 
for important politicians to be more or less openly promiscuous, the image of the 19th century statesman was that of having an impeccable private life. 
in Britain once the Revolution had occurred.  Britain 
experienced few problems recruiting people for 
military duty against France, with social class having 
very little impact on volunteering.  Britain apparently 
had reservoirs of latent cohesion in its populace to 
draw upon (Best 1982:132p; Colley 1992:287; Evans 
1983:81).8
Alexis de Tocqueville was struck by the amazing 
openness of British society compared to his own 
France, for instance making the point that although 
particular ar istocrats were hated and despised, 
aristocracy as such was not.  The middle class was ripe 
with aristocratic values.  Toward the 1830s, protest 
was instead channelled into accepted political forms, 
ending in parliamentary reform and the extension of 
the electorate (Evans 1983:218).  The British public 
sphere improved and cemented itself to such an 
extent that by the early 19th century it had been fi rmly 
institutionalized.  The right to form associations had 
been highly contested in 1780, but was a routine affair 
50 years later (Tilly 1995:12).  Tilly (1995:341pp) 
concludes quite assertively that there was a substantial 
change in the nature of ‘contentious gatherings’ 
between 1789 and 1833, in the sense that the proportion 
of non-violent interactions increased dramatically. 
The public meeting was almost instituted as an offi cial 
political instrument, as a way for those not being part 
of the electorate to be heard.
Hence, Britain saw what Colley (1992:155) 
describes as “the making of the British ruling 
class”.  The second half of the 18th century saw an 
increasingly hostile attitude towards the aristocracy. 
With respect to the endemic corruption of British 
politics, “...everyone in the British Establishment had 
his hand in the till, advanced his own male and female 
relations and was closely related by blood or marriage 
to everyone else in high offi ce” (Colley 1992:152). 
However, towards the end of the 18th century, a very 
rapid fusing of English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish elites 
through marriage and inheritance saw a convergence 
of perspectives that clearly increased the cohesion of 
the ruling class, be they Whigs or Tories, and which 
led to an overarching consensus on issues of for 
instance industrialization.  And faced with threats 
from Continental turmoil – i.e.  the French Revolution 
– ruling elites credibly redefi ned themselves as 
patriotic and heroic, authentically and enthusiastically 
British.  The ruling class was no longer seen as 
parasitic.  It had managed to restore its authority and 
legitimacy, and in the process helped shape a reformed 
British identity (Colley 1992:177-93).9
Such developments were peculiar to Britain. 
There was st i l l no united Germany.  Rather, 
politically, Prussia and Austria were fi ghting hard 
for hegemony over an area that since the Napoleonic 
Wars had been reduced from over 300 to 39 states. 
Attempts at creating a German state followed the 
uprisings in 1848-49.  Revolutionary movements 
overthrew the governments of numerous German 
states.  In the end, liberals and democrats favoring a 
united and reformed Germany lost out.  A German 
Confederation and a National Parliament was set up 
in Frankfurt, with a Habsburg archduke as nominal 
head and Provisional Executive, but with powers 
residing with the states, this was a weak Provisional 
Executive.  Without the powers to impose or collect 
taxes, no social policies could be enacted, and 
military power rested solely on the member states, 
for all practical purposes Prussia and Austria.  When 
both Austria and Prussia elected to go it alone, 
the Confederation was powerless.  An impotent 
German Confederation continued to exist until 1866, 
including Austria’s German territories (Fulbrook 
1992:117; Horstmeyer 1998:243; Kindleberger 
2000:113; Tipton 2003:52,90).
No fi rm and common German identity developed 
until the unifi cation.  German national identity was at 
one and the same time subnational and supranational. 
In Prussia ,  which emerged as the dominant 
German state, national identity was subnational, 
and in principle antinational.  National identity had 
nothing to do with blood or heritage, but with being 
subject to the Prussian king.  Considering how the 
Prussian state comprised a major Polish majority, 
an ethnocultural approach to nationality would have 
been tricky.  Further, the very hierarchic structure 
of Prussia, with so much power vested in the hands 
of the Junkers makes class a more useful concept 
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10 The fi gure hovered between 17 and 20% until 1868 (rising because of infl ation), when the next franchise extension was passed by Parliament, extending 
the franchise to roughly 35% of adult males.  In absolute fi gures, the 1832 Reform Act increased the electorate to 650,000-700,000 voters out of an adult 
male population of about 3.5 million, at a time when the French electorate was less than 200,000 out of a male population more than twice as large. 
Further reforms followed in 1866, 1869 and 1884 (Evans 1983:352; Justman & Gradstein 1999:119; Price 1993:166; Pugh 1999:48p).
than nation with respect to understanding Prussian 
nationalism.  But nationalism was also supranational, 
deriving from the fact that there was yet no Germany, 
but a host of German states that for all their rivalries 
and differences were distinctly German, even if 
there was disagreement as to what extent for instance 
Catholic and proudly independent Bavaria belonged 
in the same category as the Protestant states in 
the north.  As the unifi ed German Reich of 1871 
remained a federal state (under Prussian leadership), 
German national identity continued to struggle with 
these two conceptions of nationalism, and the issue 
was never ultimately resolved even if signifi cant 
progress toward nat ion - statehood was made 
between 1871 and 1914 through the construction of 
nation-wide institutions and the efforts of the state 
to create a national consciousness.  But as Brubaker 
states (1992:13): “two generations were not suffi cient 
to create a consolidated, ‘selbstverst ä ndlich’ 
taken-for-granted national consciousness, within the 
frame of the new state” Also, unlike Britain, German 
national identity was not derived from any notion of 
popular sovereignty.  Granted, Wilhelm I was a fairly 
benevolent Emperor.  Yet, he was also patriarchal 
and conservative and perceived of the relationship 
between people and emperor in quite old-fashioned 
terms.  He had his duties towards his subjects and 
they had theirs (between themselves and) towards 
their ruler and master.  But this did not imply popular 
sovereignty.  He did not derive his power from the 
people.  Rather, the people were his subjects, and 
as their ruler, master and father, he had his fatherly 
duties towards his people (Brubaker 1992; Melton 
2001).
NATION-BUILDING AND
THE ARRIVAL OF MASS POLITICS
In most countries politics had been a distinctly 
elite affair.  Britain was a partial exception, with Tilly 
(1995) asserting how as early as the early 19th century 
protest was channeled into institutional forms, for 
practical purposes implying that compared to other 
countries there were institutional outlets for the 
complaints and grievances of the down-and-outers. 
But this should not be taken as evidence of British 
calm and tranquility, or of the successful integration 
of the lower classes.  The integration of the lower 
classes created a number of problems, some of 
which were overcome, some of which lingered 
on.  It required institutional change, in the shape of 
franchise extensions, and it required changes to the 
party structure as the established political parties 
(Tories/Conservatives, Whigs/Liberals) struggled to 
gain control over the working class vote.  
The 1832 franchise extension did not take place 
in any atmosphere of calm and tranquility.  Most 
scholars readily agree that Britain had never been 
closer to a social revolution.  Quoting Hobsbawm 
(1969:72): “At no other period in modern UK history 
have the common people been so persistently, 
profoundly and desperately dissatisfi ed.” Despite 
strong growth, for most manual laborers, the early 
19th century was a time of hardship.  The average 
annual rate of increase in real earnings between 
1790 and 1840 was a measly 0.1%.  Real wages for 
manual laborers fl uctuated up and down, and may 
even have fallen during the 1830s.  They did not start 
pointing decidedly upwards until the 1840s (Feinstein 
1995:32; Hobsbawm 1969:77,93p).  Pugh (1999:48) 
suggests that without the 1832 election reform, the 
result would have been popular armed resistance.  
Parliamentary reform had been a demand from 
both workers and businessmen and industrialists. 
Yet, the Reform Act did not pass easily.  The Duke 
of Wellington (Tory), appointed PM in 1827, refused 
to consider parliamentary reform.  However, the 
French July Revolution (1830), which replaced the 
Bourbon king Charles X, inspired working-class and 
middle-class reformists in Britain, also alarming 
prominent Tories as to the potential revolutionary 
power of the masses.  The Wellington cabinet fell, 
and King William IV appointed a Whig cabinet, 
headed by Earl Grey, on a platform of reforming to 
prevent revolution.  In 1831, Earl Grey introduced 
a reform bill.  It passed by one single vote, but was 
rejected in the House of Lords.  The reaction to 
the rejection was widespread violence, especially 
against houses of peers and bishops voting against 
the bill.  The problem was not solved until 1832, 
when William IV appointed a number of new peers 
to the House of Lords, so as to secure majority for 
reform.  And so, the 1832 Reform Act fi nally passed 
(Lloyd-Jones 1990:591; Pugh 1999:48pp; Quinault 
1993:197).
The Reform Act effectively doubled the size of 
the franchise, to roughly 18% of all adult males.10 
It for all practical purpose enfranchised the middle 
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11 In 1867, 77% of Great Britain’s population belonged to the “manual labor class” (Hobsbawm 1969:154). 
classes, but not the numerous workers, who had 
also fought for the franchise extension.  Ironically, 
as Chartism threatened the political system in the 
1840s, the middle class would now instead come 
down on the side of the traditional elites, for social 
and political stability, against anything vaguely 
resembling revolutionary working-class demands. 
The middle class would play a crucial role in 
maintaining the social and political stability of the 
regime, providing it with a legitimacy that was sorely 
lacking in other countries (Hobsbawm 1969:77; Pugh 
1999:48pp,71pp; Tilly 2004:163).
By mid-century, Britain was again a calmer 
place, in particular when compared to the Continent. 
France underwent no less than two actual revolutions, 
in both 1830 and 1848, and present-day Germany 
underwent a number of revolutions during that same 
year.  In Britain, protest and dissent were slowly 
institutionalized, with previously revolutionary 
movements now working within the system rather 
than trying to bring it down from the outside (Perkin 
1969:393; Tilly 1995:12).
By mid-19th century politics was calm.  The 
Mid-Victorian period is usually considered one 
of growth and stability.  Problems of national 
identity were long resolved, with I reland the 
only real problem.  Organized workers favored 
radical Liberalism rather than more revolutionary 
movements, the middle class was healthy, all classes 
took part in economic growth and no particular class 
seemed to dominate (Colley 1992:12pp; Landes 
1998:219; Pugh 1999:71pp,103).
Two more franchise extensions followed, in 1867 
and 1884-85.  A mid-1860s economic slump led to 
discontent and to people fl ooding onto the streets. 
Hence, a bill extending the franchise was considered 
wise by all the parties.  In 1866, the Liberal Party, 
under William Gladstone proposed a very cautious 
bill, for practical purposes extending the franchise 
to some 100,000 people – primarily artisans and 
shopkeepers, already mostly pro-Liberal.  It was 
turned down, resulting in a minority Conservative 
government by Benjamin Disraeli the following 
year pushing through a far more comprehensive bill, 
increasing the electorate from 1.3 to 2.45 million, 
followed by the 1872 Secret Ballot Act.  After 
1870, it was overwhelmingly evident that mass 
participation would arrive, like it or not.  Britain was 
a country of workers,11 and the reforms of 1867 and 
1884-85 based the electoral system on the working 
class vote, with the 1885 Third Reform Act extending 
the franchise to 5.7 million, or roughly 60% of the 
adult male population.  Yet, the same parties stayed 
in power.  Socialism emerged during the 1880s, but 
the British Labour Party (founded in 1900) took a 
moderate stance on most issues.  Urbanization and 
industrialization did put great strains on British 
society, but the working class was not to any 
great extent considered revolutionary.  Socialist 
organizations were weak, as were trade unions, 
whose membership numbers for a while actually 
decreased, down to 750,000 in 1888 from around a 
million in 1874, or around 15% of manual workers, 
despite the fact that union membership did not suffer 
any legal repression.  No strong class consciousness 
existed.  Many workers were opposed to state 
intervention and enthusiastically supported free 
trade.  Attempts at strikes were few and unsuccessful 
(Evans 1983:351; Gi lber t & Large 2002:39; 
Hobsbawm 1969:126,238; Hoppen 1998:649; Pugh 
1999:98pp,123pp; Thompson 1999:27p).
In Germany, the integration process was far 
rougher.  In Britain, much of the 19th century had been 
a process of integration (if not always successful); in 
Germany it was one of integration by disintegration. 
When Bismarck in 1871 succeeded in unifying 
Germany, the newly created Reich was not nearly 
as homogeneous as Britain.  Or at least, it did not 
perceive itself as equally homogeneous, and this 
lack of perceived homogeneity was a problem.  One 
of the problems of German unifi cation was that to a 
considerable extent this could be viewed as Prussia 
conquering the rest of Germany.  Prussian king 
Wilhelm now became Emperor Wilhelm I of Germany 
(while still remaining king of Prussia).  The capital 
remained in Berlin.  And while Prussia had formerly 
been the overwhelmingly dominant part of the North 
German Federation, the victory in the Franco-Prussian 
war meant that the southern German principalities, like 
Bavaria and a few others – culturally and religiously 
distinct – had now joined the new Reich.  
Along the lines of Stein Rokkan (1987), the 
higher number of political cleavages in Germany 
made the integration process tenuous and confl ictual. 
In Britain, questions of national identity were long 
resolved, religious problems insignifi cant, and 
sociocultural and territorial cleavages only minor. 
Hence, the only cleavage of signifi cance was the labor 
market cleavage – the introduction of the masses onto 
the political scene.  Granted, the Celtic fringes of 
the kingdom would fi re up from time to time, but in 
terms of their economic power and signifi cance, and 
their political infl uence, they were unproblematic.  In 
Germany, unifi cation ran into problems right away, 
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12 The fi rst steps to reestablish relations did not take place until Leo XIII became Pope in 1878 (Tipton 2003:169). 
13 Bismarck and Germany pioneered this kind of legislation in Europe: sickness insurance legislation (1883), accident insurance (1884), and old age and 
disability insurance (1889) (Fulbrook 1992:134). 
14 Granted, rural aristocrats had long been disproportionately represented in Parliament even if less so than in the early 19th century (Quinault 1993).  But 
unlike in Germany, the least industrialized areas were not politically the most powerful.  
accentuated by the fact that national euphoria within 
two years gave way to a major economic depression.  
Bismarck’s way of unifying the country was 
by uniting what he considered the core of the 
nation against the minorities.  Hence, the new 
German public sphere was fi lled with strife, with 
the Kulturkampf for all practical purposes being 
an anti-Catholic crusade.  In the Reichstag, the 
National Liberals was the biggest party.  However, 
Bismarck a l lying with the Nat ional Liberals 
came at a cost.  Catholics were considered inner 
enemies, and a threat to true unifi cation.  Also, 
Catholicism was part of a cosmopolitan tradition, 
and thus inherently anti-nationalistic.  This became 
particularly relevant as the newly annexed areas of 
Alsace and Lorraine were Catholic, with the share 
of Catholics in the Reich rising to as high as 36%.  A 
tendency for religious identities to become ever more 
unyielding, and especially the tendency to identify 
German national identity with Protestantism led to 
laws against religious (read: Catholic) infl uence on 
education (1871-72), as well as the breaking off of 
diplomatic relations with the Vatican (1872).12  The 
confrontation with the Catholics was framed in terms 
of bombs and swords, and Catholic riots were heavily 
suppressed.  The obvious result was Catholics 
actively resenting the new state and the formation 
of separate Catholic organizations and networks. 
Hence, rather than consolidating the Empire, the 
split deepened.  For the remainder of the century, the 
Catholic Center Party (Zentrum) would take roughly 
100 seats in the Reichstag, comprising a hostile and 
resentful permanent minority of around 20% (Schulze 
1998:160p; Tipton 2003:163pp,230).
The other permanent minority was the Socialists. 
Catholics were seen to jeopardize German culture, 
the Socialists German society.  Like the Catholics, 
the lower classes were refused entry into government, 
and they were not integrated into the civil society 
and public sphere of the Bürgertum.  Hence, they 
developed separate networks and organizations, 
sta r t ing with labor unions and moving on to 
political parties.  Bismarck’s response was twofold. 
His second response was remunerative: Through 
programs that would improve the quality of life of 
the lower classes, like the social insurance laws, the 
workers would become loyal to the government, as 
they would see that they had a stake in the system 
(Tipton 2003).  
However, h is fi rst response was punit ive, 
seeking a ban against socialist parties.  After 1878, 
Bismarck allied with the conservative parties to 
pass the anti-Socialist Laws, banning organizations 
supporting “activities designed to subvert the existing 
political and social order in ways that threaten the 
public order and particularly the harmony of the 
social classes” (Tipton 2003:167).  The fi rst attempt 
at a law was put forth after an assassination attempt 
on Wilhelm I, but was rejected in the Reichstag.  But 
when the second assassination followed shortly after 
(although not by a Socialist and unconnected to the 
fi rst), Bismarck dissolved the Reichstag, launched a 
campaign against the Socialists and the Liberals and 
successfully pushed through an anti-Socialist law that 
would have to be reviewed and renewed every three 
years.  For practical purposes, the law failed, as it 
did not prevent voters to vote for socialist candidates, 
and since parliamentary immunity saw to it that even 
socialists were protected as long as they sat in the 
Reichstag.  Socialist parties increased their share of 
the votes in every election, with the SPD becoming 
the biggest party at the 1890 election (although 
only getting 35 seats due to election rules heavily 
favoring Junker candidates and districts).  During 
the 1880s, Bismarck tried to counter the growing 
socialist infl uence by implementing social insurance 
legislation.13  While this was a partial success in 
many ways, it did not win him the working class vote, 
or halt the socialist parties.  In 1877 the SPD received 
500,000 votes, increasing to 1.4 million by 1890 and 
4.2 million by 1912.  In 1912 they even became the 
largest party in the Reichstag, with 110 seats (Born 
1976:28; Fulbrook 1992:134; Klug 2001:225; Schulze 
1998:163pp; Tipton 2003:150, 167pp, 234; Wehler 
1985:132).
A fi nal major cleavage was the urban—rural one. 
In Britain, the rural fringes were exactly that – fringes.14 
In Germany, this was where power was located.  As late 
as the early 20th century, in a country industrializing 
at breakneck speed, where cities experienced explosive 
growth, and where the working class was growing 
by the minute, the locus of power was the agrarian, 
arch-conservative and industrially quite backward 
eastern part of Prussia, home of the Junkers.  The 
Army swore allegiance to the King of Prussia, not the 
Emperor of Germany.  There was no German minister 
of war.  Rather, there was a Prussian Minister of War. 
The constitution of the Reich was highly authoritarian, 
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15 Taking over from Lord Palmerston, who had headed Liberal cabinets in 1855-58 and 1859-65. 
16 Lord Salisbury led three conservative governments: 1885-86, 1886-92, and 1895-1902.
with the Emperor holding extremely wide-ranging 
powers.  The core of the German apparatus of state was 
derived from the Prussian Junker class, people who 
were fi ercely proud – not of their “Germanness”, but of 
their status as Junkers, essentially of being German but 
better, of belonging to a class and a nation of their own, 
but of the class and nation that had created Germany. 
Here again, we see that strange combination of sub- and 
supra-nationality embedded in the Prussian Junkers. 
German, and at the same time not.  
While the Reich sought to promote a feeling of 
“Germanness” among its citizens, this did not derive 
from the Junkers (even if the Emperor was a Prussian 
and the Chancellor a Junker), but from the urbanized 
Bürgertum.  The monuments erected to celebrate 
the nation did not derive from the aristocracy or the 
military, but from the city-dwellers (even if these 
monuments tended to celebrate the aristocracy and the 
military), and they were funded locally, not nationally. 
Ironically, amongst the German elites, the tendency 
to see urban people as actual or potential criminals, 
was widespread.  Obviously, this applied primarily to 
the workers, who should not ever be trusted, but the 
attitudes towards city-dwellers in general was one of 
skepticism.  The aristocracy worried about the middle 
class, the middle class about the working class.  People 
in the rural societies saw themselves as living by a 
code of duty and sacrifi ce, with the city characterized 
by egotism and ambition and an unhealthy desire for 
material goods.  The Gemeinschaft of the traditional 
community, with dense webs of relat ionships 
was being tossed aside by the Gesellschaft of the 
modern society, where the traditional network had 
been lost, and where individuals only cared for 
themselves, seeing other human beings merely as 
means to something else.  But conservative power 
rested on the power of Prussia, and industrialization 
meant that Prussia was becoming economically less 
important and the fi nancial situation of the Junkers 
more precarious.  The unresolved position of Prussia 
remained with Germany as one of its greatest 
structural problems, and was not resolved until World 
War I: Reactionary politically and economically, and 
holding on to its dominant position within Germany 
as the world and Germany changed before it, and as 
the Junkers and Prussia itself became ever more of 
an anachronism – a semi-feudal political center in an 
industrialized country where the Social Democrats 
had now become the biggest political party (Tipton 
2003:132,150,157,215pp,238p).
THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE
While the inclusion of the masses took place in 
a far friendlier and more harmonious atmosphere 
in Britain than in Germany, some of the policy 
outcomes are similar enough with Germany to 
deserve mentioning.  My suggestion here is that the 
inclusion of the masses had essentially the same 
effect on both countries, but taking the far more 
moderate policy environment of Britain into account 
the British response was predictably more moderate 
than the German.  
However, in both countries we see an ever stronger 
tendency towards the late 19th century towards 
policies and rhetoric of empire, with the explicit 
purpose of pushing thorny domestic political issues 
to the side.  The British Conservative Party had been 
split ever since the repeal of the Corn Laws (1846), 
and had been out of power for 20 years by the time of 
the 1867 franchise extension.  By the 1860s, British 
politics was centering around a fairly radical Liberal 
party under the leadership of William Gladstone.15 
The Conservatives, under Benjamin Disraeli, had 
only to a very moderate extent managed to adjust 
to mass politics.  Extending the franchise further 
would only worsen this, unless something drastic was 
done.  Hence, the party changed its tactic, consciously 
trying to win the vote of the lower classes.  It now 
became the party of traditional values, of benevolent 
paternalism and protection against brutal laissez-faire. 
Against a radical Liberal Party, the Conservatives 
put up a staunch defense of private property, against 
radicalism, Irish nationalism and socialism.  The party 
also courted the trade unions far more eagerly than 
Gladstone, and rejected the puritanism and asceticism 
of the liberals with respect to for instance alcohol. 
Above all, the Conservative Party became the party 
of patriotism, Imperial ambition and pride, and of 
British supremacy and superiority.  While this did not 
work during the fi rst post-1867 election it did bring 
the party back to such an extent that in 1874, with a 
far larger franchise, Benjamin Disraeli could form 
a Conservative cabinet that lasted until 1880.  From 
1886, headed by lord Salisbury,16 the Conservative 
Party would go on to dominate British politics for the 
next 20 years, even through an 1884-85 third franchise 
extension granting more than 60 per cent of the male 
population the right to vote (Hoppen 1998:645; Pugh 
1999:92pp; Thompson 1999:27p).  
1886 signaled a shift in British politics.  Previous 
decades had been decades of domestic politics; free 
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17 Between 1871 and 1914 60 books were published by English fi ction writers on foreign countries invading Britain.  41 of these invasions were German (18 
French) (Phillips 2007:230).
18 The period prior to the downturn had seen the so-called Great Depression.  However, impoverishment of British workers was not one of the consequences – 
counterintuitively, the last quarter of the 19th century was the period in which the situation of British workers improved the most rapidly. 
trade, peace, retrenchment and reform.  But defending 
traditional causes like the Union with Ireland, the 
monarchy, the Empire, the Church of England, 
religious education and private property had brought 
the Conservatives signifi cant amounts of voters.  Thus, 
the following decades would be dominated by fears of 
external threats – colonial rivalry, naval race, the fear 
of invasion.17  Conservatives actively pushed domestic 
issues off the agenda, pushing foreign policy, and 
staying away from thorny issues like free trade and 
schooling.  Gladstone, the Liberal leader, was already 
strongly free trade, and beyond that had no view of the 
economy as a whole.  From the far left, there was not 
much to fear, as unions had become weaker over the 
previous decade and a half.  Despite both Gladstone 
and Salisbury being deeply reluctant over colonial 
policies, what was especially striking towards the 
end of the 19th century was the increased enthusiasm 
towards the Empire by ordinary citizens.  Britain had 
a duty to save the world.  Missionary zeal, jingoism 
and moral imperialism went hand in hand as Britons 
extremely eagerly took on “the white man’s burden”. 
Hence, Imperialism not only provided a source of 
pride and purpose in the sense of gaining territory 
and international prestige, but also by providing these 
poor Africans religious salvation as well as liberating 
them from the clutches of Arab colonialism and the 
consequence of this colonialism, namely slavery. 
Hence, late 19th century British politics would to a 
great extent focus on Imperial triumphs and fi ascoes, 
not on free trade vs. protectionism and education 
reform (Hoppen 1998:649; Pakenham 1991; Phillips 
2007:230pp; Pugh 1999:107pp,129-36).  
Free trade is one of the areas in which one might 
have expected the Conservative party to try to reverse 
previous policies.  The Conservatives had split on the 
repeal of the Corn Laws, with two thirds of the party 
going against their own PM.  But this was one area 
of domestic politics that was pushed aside.  Beyond 
a few futile attempts at re-introducing protectionism 
immediately following the repeal, in a remarkably 
short time protectionism became political suicide.  It 
was associated with high food prices, starvation and 
the selfi sh interests of the landed aristocracy.  The 
skilled workmen – that is, the major new group to 
receive voting rights with the 1867 franchise extension 
– were strongly pro-free trade.  While things would 
change somewhat towards the very end of the century, 
there was a strong alliance between Liberals and the 
organized working class (and supported by most of 
the manufacturing industry) (Hobsbawm 1969:120; 
Judd 1996:58pp, 65; Pugh 1999:101).
Although sympathetic to the reintroduction of 
tariffs, Conservative governments chose to keep 
quiet, testament to how sure they were that it would 
lose them the next election.  Even with British 
industries struggling and the economy in obvious 
decline, in 1906 when the tariff issue was raised, 
the Liberals scored a landslide election victory, 
postponing any notion of reform into an indefi nite 
future (Judd 1996:150,187pp; Klug 2001:221; Pugh 
1999:115,145).  For political reasons, rather than 
economic, tariffs could and would not be discussed. 
A combination of strong anti-protectionist sentiment 
amongst the voters and the political dominance of 
the pro-free trade Liberal Party, made any upwards 
tariff revisions for all practical purposes impossible.  
After the turn of the century, Britain experienced 
problems on an ever larger scale.  The imperial 
enthusiasm dimmed considerably after the Boer War. 
From now and until World War I, wages stagnated or 
even fell.18  Harmony, stability and prosperity gave 
way to uneasiness and tension.  This went together 
with stronger unions (membership increased to 1.9 
million in 1900, and to over 4 million by 1914 (Pugh 
1999:125)), labor unrest, strikes, the radicalization of 
the socialist left and general political breakdown.  The 
union was not particularly radical compared to what 
was the case on the Continent, and most working-class 
organizations showed little interest in Marxist ideas. 
Still, the number of strikes increased from 300-400 
a year in 1902-06 to 800-900 in 1911-14, Britain no 
longer being more peaceful than other European 
countries.  When World War I arrived, it was almost 
met by relief, as a respite from crisis (Gilbert & Large 
2002:41; Hobsbawm 1969:193; Perkin 1969:173; Pugh 
1999:127,135,147; Shorter & Tilly 1974:309).
...they were the only years when the stable 
and fl exible mechanism of British political 
adjustment ceased to function, and when 
the naked bones of power emerged from 
the accumulations of tissue which normally 
concealed them.  These were the years when 
the Lords defi ed the Commons, when an 
extreme right, not merely ultra-conservative 
but nationalist, vitriolic, demagogic and 
anti-Semitic, looked like emerging into the 
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19 Which is not to say that Germany was a democracy.  It was an Empire, with a Kaiser who was not bound by the Reichstag.  The Reichstag was in charge 
of budgetary affairs.  
20 Bismarck had earlier advocated a policy of colonialism in order to prevent the relationship with Britain to become too close.  Friedrich III, the successor 
of Wilhelm I, was pro-British.  Bismarck fi gured that a policy of colonialism might bring on confl ict with Britain at virtually any time, and was thus a 
good antidote against pro-British policies in Germany.  In any case, Friedrich died from cancer to the throat, only 99 days after being crowned Emperor 
(Tipton 2003:174).
21 But these attitudes had also spread to the business world.  Business was power and economic growth an equivalent of military expansion.  The German 
state conceived of the economy as a national task.  Economic nationalism was as important as general German nationalism (Greenfeld 2001:154,218). 
open, when scandals of fi nancial corruption 
racked governments, when – most serious of 
all – army offi cers with the backing of the 
Conservative Party mutinied against laws 
passed by Parliament.  They were the years 
when wisps of violence hung in the English 
air...  (Hobsbawm 1969:193)
In Germany, social cohesion was put to the 
test in a far more serious manner, and here as well 
imperial rhetoric became one of the most obvious 
answers.  By the end of the 19th century it became 
ever more obvious that much of Bismarck’s political 
maneuvering was essentially that: Maneuvering!  He 
had no clear economic policy, no party affi liation and 
no intentions of relying for support on any one party. 
Prior to unifi cation, for several years he had governed 
without a budget, since the Prussian Landtag had 
refused to approve it.  Without any legal provisions 
he had seen to it that he as Minister-President of 
Prussia would also become German Chancellor after 
the unifi cation.  Hence, if he encountered resistance 
in the Prussian Landtag, he could get around it by 
repeating the process at the national level instead. 
He had insisted on male suffrage for both the North 
German Bundestag (prior to unifi cation) and the 
German Reichstag, as he was confi dent that the 
masses would side with him.19  When this turned 
out not to be true, he very seriously considered a 
coup d’etat.  He was not ideologically opposed to 
modernization, industrialization and the demands of 
industry.  Then again, he also had no commitment 
to it.  Bismarck’s commitment was to himself, to the 
Junkers and to the Kaiser.  His success consisted 
of striking a precarious balance between powerful 
social forces, trying to preserve some sort of a status 
quo, while at the same time the social and political 
consequences of industrialization being ever more 
evident.  Hence, politics and policy-making was often 
hamstrung by confl ict.  Bismarck’s commitment to 
free trade was as fl eeting as his later commitment 
to protectionism, and had more to do with his 
personal preferences as a Junker, and his perceived 
need to raise revenue that would be independent of 
the Reichstag, as it had to do with any change in 
conviction.  The combination of socialist parties 
growing in strength and infl uence and the ascendancy 
of a new and more hostile Kaiser (Wilhelm II), 
meant too many interests to balance, Bismarck being 
removed from power in 1890.  While this does not 
deny the fact that he was successful in preserving for 
himself and his administration a certain amount of 
autonomy, it also bears witness of a Germany where, 
in spite of rapid industrialization, other concerns 
were more important.  Bismarck never cared to build 
political consensus or formal political alliances, and 
as the socialists rose, the lack of political consensus 
became ever more obvious (Rogowski 1989:40; 
Tipton 2003:159pp; Wehler 1985:57pp).
The post-Bismarck period (the Wilhelmine era) 
saw tensions rise further.  Weak governments based 
on short-lived compromises meant that pressure 
groups became more important, with considerable 
infl uence on government policy.  The popularity of 
the socialists kept rising after the 1890 abolition of 
the anti-Socialist Laws – from 1.4 million votes in 
1890 to 4.2 million in 1912.  With this went union 
growth from 680,000 members in 1900 to 2.5 
million in 1913.  Mass strikes and demonstrations 
are well documented.  In order to counter the 
socialist threat, the Kaiser and his nearest circle 
of government pursued the so-called Weltpolitik. 
While undoubtedly to a considerable extent also 
refl ecting the Emperor’s personal preferences and 
delusions of grandeur, more cynically the Weltpolitik 
was also a very deliberate attempt to draw attention 
away from social unrest, an ever more powerful 
Social Democratic Party, and a growing working 
class.20  It worked in part, but more so by winning 
over the anti-aristocratic forces of the bourgeoisie 
than the working class.  Hence, the contradictions 
between extremely conservative Junkers and a 
socialist working class in an ever more industrialized 
society were to a major extent checked by ever more 
obvious appeals to nationalism and adventurous 
foreign policies.  The middle classes identifi ed 
themselves with the nation and took pride in foreign 
politics.  It was a widespread attitude that colonies 
were a matter of life and death.  Germany took 
patriotic pride fi rst and foremost in its military 
strength and its colonial acquisitions.21  Wilhelm 
II was never more popular than when in 1896 he 
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22 Here it should be added that even as late as late the foundation of the German Empire, no distinct German identity existed.  People would rather describe 
themselves as Prussians, Bavarians or Saxons than Germans (although it is clear that a German national consciousness grew as a consequence of war 
against France).  What was conspicuous to most non-Prussians, was that the new state was as much a Greater Prussia as it was a Germany.  Thus, 
Prussian hegemony was met with strong anti-Prussian feelings in parts of the new Empire, especially in the south.  Whereas Britain and France where 
among the fi rst states to form a national identity, in Germany, this developed only slowly.  It was triggered by Napoleon’s battering of Prussian armies at 
Jena in 1806, but disappeared when the French troops did.  Surges of nationalistic feelings, accompanied by political discontent occurred on numerous 
occasions during the early 19th century – 1813, 1817, 1830.  But no German national consciousness would start developing until the 1840s.
(stupidly...) defi ed Britain and sent a congratulatory 
telegram to the newly elected Boer president Paul 
Kruger of Transvaal in southern Africa, after 
Kruger’s forces had defeated an invasion attempt by 
British raiders in Rhodesia.  While nationalism also 
spread to the workers, several authors argue that the 
contradictions and tensions in the German Empire 
could only keep growing, and that the main reason 
why no revolution, or other discontinuous break, took 
place, was that World War I came to the rescue.22 
This reveals some of the problems that German 
chancellors faced.  It was not only the matter of 
securing political majorities in the Reichstag, but the 
whole empire rested on weak social foundations.  In 
order to engender social cohesion among the masses, 
and thus increase the relative autonomy of the 
regime, foreign policy diversions were manufactured 
in order to take the focus off domestic problems 
(Fulbrook 1992:117,140pp; Pakenham 1991:490; 
Schulze 1998:118pp,173pp; Stürmer 2002:45; Tipton 
2003:90,186; Wehler 1985:63p,89p,102pp,137,177).  
Tipton (2003:175) makes the point that it was 
very possibly not the case that German politics 
refl ected the primacy of foreign policy, but rather the 
primacy of domestic politics.  Foreign policies were 
actively used to put a lid on domestic problems.  He 
also claims that it would have taken an exceptionally 
imaginative, sympathetic and focused leadership 
to have bridged the gaps with respect to Catholics, 
Socialists, and the rural-urban confl ict.  Germany 
was nowhere near having such a leadership.  
CONCLUSIONS
Britain and Germany may have had very different 
19th century experiences in terms of nation-building, 
nationalism, democratization, the inclusion of 
the masses and the evolution of the public sphere. 
Britain was by far the more developed country, and 
a country that had successfully been able to deal 
with most of its economic and social problems, 
at least compared to other European countries. 
Germany was the newly unifi ed country riddled 
with a militaristic, hierarchic and anti-industrial 
politically dominant Prussia.  It was a country that 
needed to deal with a number of different political, 
social and economic problems more or less from the 
outset.  Hence, one might imagine that Britain’s and 
Germany’s experiences with respect to the inclusion 
of the masses might vary wildly.  In one respect 
this is true, in another it is very much not.  Britain 
far more successfully integrated its lower classes 
through franchise extensions and through a political 
system that remained comparatively calm and 
peaceful, not undergoing major changes until after 
World War I.  Germany was plagued with confl ict 
and strife, strikes and demonstrations, the splitting 
up of the country in essentially three distinct camps, 
all of which looked at members of the other camps in 
stereotypes and with mutual suspicion and animosity: 
Nationalist, Catholics, and Socialists.  The national 
minorities of Schleswig, Alsace-Lorraine, and of 
Posen in East Prussia tended to defi ne themselves 
more in terms of their “own” ethnic nations than 
as Germans, and more so in 1900 than in 1870, all 
testament to the failed and fairly heavy-handed 
Germanization policies carried out in these parts 
(Tipton 2003:225p).  The country was held together 
by a Chancellor whose maneuverings may have been 
necessary to keep the country stable, but which did 
not constitute any long-term plan for nation-building 
or the inclusion of the masses nor did it contribute to 
long-term stability.  
But despite this, despite the very different starting 
conditions, one similarity between the two countries 
is still very much evident, and it is a similarity that 
has to do with the state’s response to the challenges 
brought on by mass politics.  In both countries, the 
late 19th century was ever more characterized by 
nationalism (or rather: jingoism), by hostility towards 
other nations, by aggressive politics of Empire and 
colonialism.  Both the British and the German states 
used foreign politics to subdue ever greater problems 
in the domestic arena.  Granted, these problems 
were smaller in Britain, but they were by no means 
non-existent here either, and they were mounting.  In 
Britain, the Conservative Party knew that it needed 
to empty out the domestic arena of politics if it were 
to have any chance of wooing the voters of the newly 
enfranchised working classes away from the Liberal 
Party.  In order for the Conservatives to do this, 
they needed a political platform distinctly different 
from that of the Liberals.  They did this by shying 
away from domestic politics, where they would not 
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be able to beat the Liberals anyway, and focus more 
or less exclusively on foreign politics and on values 
and morality.  This did the trick.  In Germany, the 
need to do similar things rested not primarily with 
the parties.  While elected through universal male 
suffrage, the Reichstag was for all practical purposes 
impotent.  Power rested with the Chancellor, that 
is, Bismarck (for as long as he had the Emperor’s 
confi dence) .  Hence, the choice to advocate 
nationalistic policies lie not with the Reichstag but 
with Bismarck, and after Bismarck was booted out 
of power, with Wilhelm II and his advisors.  And 
while Wilhelm II undoubtedly harbored numerous 
delusions of personal and national grandeur, there 
is little doubt that his advisors (and to some extent 
Wilhelm himself) were cunningly using Weltpolitik 
to guard themselves against social and political 
domestic problems.  
The consequence of all this was a public sphere 
that towards the end of the 19th century and the 
beginning of the 20th became less sophisticated and 
less evolved, rather than the opposite, in both Britain 
and in Germany.  It became infested with ideals of 
nationalism and chauvinism, of international battle 
and strife rather than cooperation, of disintegration 
rather than integration, of confusion rather than 
enlightenment.  These were decades of nihilism 
rather than of a republican peace.  It took two wars 
for the inclusion of the masses to become fi nal and 
for the public sphere to fi nally start recovering.  
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